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1. Introduction
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued
its Fourth Assessment Report on the state of the world’s climate. The
report stated that ‘[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is
now evident from observations of increases in global average air and
ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising
global average sea level’.1 The report presents detailed evidence for this
claim and further evidence to establish what it calls the ‘anthropogenic
drivers’ of climate change, that is, the actions brought about by human
beings as opposed to those resulting from natural processes such as
atmospheric changes. The report is clear that the causes attributable to
human action, particularly fossil fuel use, have greatly increased climate
change over the last 200 years.2 The consequences of climate change are
dire, as the report warns, including potential harm to vast numbers of
inhabitants of the planet. The next report of the IPCC appeared in late
2014 and its conclusions reinforce those of previous reports.
While some have questioned the conclusions of the IPCC reports over
the years, there is broad scientiﬁc consensus concerning the fact of
climate change. What is missing is a global consensus about whom or
what is responsible for this change. One can argue that human beings are
central to this change, but when it comes to determining responsibility
more precisely, this point is not helpful. It is unhelpful because the scope
of climate change is global and because, in some way, all humans seem
responsible for it. But the idea of responsibility is problematic here. Not
* Director, Centre for Global Constitutionalism, School of International Relations, Univer-
sity of St Andrews.
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report, ‘Climate Change
2007: Synthesis Report’ (Geneva, 2007), at 30, see www.ipcc.ch (last accessed on 5
June 2014).
2 Ibid., at 36–41.
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every person consumes the same amount of fossil fuels or food. More-
over, individual persons are located in political communities which
organise their political and economic activities in ways that those indi-
viduals may or may not be able to control. A similar problem exists for
states. Not all states have contributed to global climate change in the
same way. And, the inherent transboundary nature of climate change has
meant that even when states try in their own domestic policies to address
climate change, they cannot necessarily control it.
There has been, of course, an international legal response to climate
change, one built on a revision to our standard understanding of respon-
sibility, which has come to be known as ‘common but differentiated
responsibility’. In 1992, at a summit in Rio de Janeiro, a treaty was
drafted that entered into force in 1994. This treaty, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change3 was originally more aspir-
ational than actionable; that is, it had little in the way of obligations and
commitments that bound states to act. This changed in 1997 with the
passage of the Kyoto Protocol4 which demanded that states begin a
progressive reduction in carbon emissions through a series of mechan-
isms such as carbon trading, or the ability to ‘buy and sell’ credits for
carbon emissions. The Protocol gave greater speciﬁcity to the idea of
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, a term in the original treaty,
which placed a heavier burden on developed states to lower their carbon
emissions more quickly than the developing countries. The Protocol
came into effect in 2005.
The proposal for common but differentiated responsibilities has not
gone down well with powerful states whose responsibilities under the
terms of the Protocol are much greater than other states. The United
States, which has not ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol because of its objections
to the idea of common but differentiated responsibilities, has argued, in
the words of Secretary of State John Kerry, ‘[p]lain and simple, all nations
have a responsibility to make near-term emissions reductions’.5 Admit-
tedly, the United States, under the administration of President Barack
Obama, has sought to respond to climate change in more active ways
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in
force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107.
4 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto,
10 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 2303 UNTS 148 (Kyoto Protocol or
Protocol).
5 J. Kerry, ‘Getting the US-China Climate Partnership Right’, US Department of State,
19 July 2013, see www.state.gov/secretary/remarks (last accessed on 5 June 2014).
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than the preceding US administration. Yet, it is undoubtedly true that the
United States does not see its responsibility to respond to climate change
through a differentiated lens, but through a simple lens of all states
making roughly equivalent contributions.
Climate change, in other words, challenges our ideas about responsi-
bility. Its global scope and complexity make identifying responsible
agents very difﬁcult. More importantly, simple causal notions of respon-
sibility do not seem to capture the complexity of the issue. One idea
would be to abandon the discourse of responsibility in relation to climate
change because it is simply too imprecise to provide any helpful moral,
legal, or political frameworks by which to respond to this issue.6 But
perhaps there exists in alternative discourses of responsibility some
means by which to rethink this issue at the global level. Holding agents
responsible can generate a number of possible outcomes: forcing agents
to provide reparations, punishing agents who have violated rights, ensur-
ing the continued viability of a legal order to govern environmental
problems, and encouraging new modes of political action.
The proposal of the editors of this volume to explore the idea of shared
responsibility in international law7 provides one alternative that provides
some new insights into climate change. This chapter will build on their
idea, along with a review of moral philosophers and political theorists, to
propose an understanding of responsibility that points toward political
action by multiple agents across the international system as the bearers of
responsibility in the international order rather than simply powerful
states. This idea of political responsibility builds upon more traditional
notions of responsibility, but, coupled with the idea of shared responsi-
bility, suggests how this alternative, which I call ‘shared political respon-
sibility’, provides a means by which the discourse of responsibility
surrounding climate change can avoid being bogged down in discussions
of causation and blame, and move toward means of action across mul-
tiple political realms.
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews two important
moral philosophers on the question of responsibility, Peter Strawson
6 See D.H. Cole, ‘The Problem of Shared Irresponsibility in International Climate Law’,
Chapter 10 of this volume, 290, where he argues that liability approaches to climate change
are problematic in that they fail to provide incentives. I would disagree slightly with his
interpretation in that the rational choice underlying his claims are not ones that I think
capture the full dimensions of international politics.
7 See P.A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law:
A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34 MIJIL 359.
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and Marion Smiley. It then moves to two political theorists, William
Connolly and Hannah Arendt, as theorists of political responsibility.
Building on these four theorists, the chapter then moves to a discussion
of the legal theories of responsibility, concluding with Nollkaemper and
Jacobs’ idea of shared responsibility, which I connect to the idea of
political responsibility (section 3). The fourth section of the chapter
reviews various proposals for resolving climate change and evaluates
them in terms of the idea of shared political responsibility that
I develop in this chapter.
2. Responsibility
Through an engagement with a series of moral and political philoso-
phers, I argue here that legal responsibility can be supplemented by what
I call ‘political responsibility’.8 This means that instead of solely tying
individual agents to speciﬁc actions, this initial act of locating responsi-
bility in speciﬁc agents can be used to compel agents to engage in forms
of political action that construct new political arrangements, rather than
ending in punitive or even restorative consequences. This does not mean
that the results of moral and legal responsibility are discarded; rather,
they are enfolded into a set of practices that can lead to new actions by
not only those held responsible, but by the wider community of agents.
In order to develop this point, though, let me begin by exploring the idea
of responsibility in moral philosophy.
Responsibility has two interrelated meanings: ﬁrst, one is responsible
for performing or not performing certain actions as a result of an identity
or role in which one has been placed or has placed oneself; second, one
can be held responsible for acting or failing to act in certain ways. The
two senses are obviously interrelated in that one is held responsible after
8 This section draws upon various pieces I have written on responsibility and punishment.
These include: A.F. Lang, Jr., ‘Responsibility in the International System: Reading U.S.
Foreign Policy in the Middle East’ (1999) 5(1) EJIR 67; A.F. Lang, Jr., ‘The United Nations
and the Fall of Srebrenica: Meaningful Responsibility and International Society’, in T.
Erskine (ed.), Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and Inter-
national Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 183; A.F. Lang, Jr., ‘Evil,
Agency and Punishment’, in R. Jeffery (ed.), Confronting Evil in International Relations:
Ethical Responses to Problems of Moral Agency (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 89;
and A.F. Lang, Jr., ‘Punishing Genocide: A Critical Reading of the International Court of
Justice’, in T. Isaacs and R. Vernon (eds.), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), 92.
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the fact for actions that result from the adoption of a role that creates
those responsibilities. Responsibility, in turn, requires that an individual
has the agency required to intend, plan, and execute the actions. Gener-
ally, we assume that only natural persons have the agency and hence
responsibility for the type of action that would constitute such a
violation.9
More often than not, we use the term responsibility in the second way,
that is, we hold agents responsible for actions without specifying in
advance a particular role or identity that has created this responsibility.
This is because responsibility is ﬁrst and foremost a moral term. That is,
we tend to hold individuals responsible for their actions simply because
we assume they are capable, intentional moral agents who should under-
stand broadly conceived moral rules. This assumption about responsi-
bility underlies a famous philosophical paper written by Peter Strawson
in 1963, eventually published as ‘Freedom and Resentment’.10 He begins
with a debate about the consequences for human behaviour of the thesis
of determinism. The thesis of determinism – the belief that all actions are
determined prior to their taking place and that human beings have no
control over those actions in ways that are morally relevant – impacts our
understanding of moral responsibility at its core, because if determinism
is true the concept of responsibility makes no sense. Strawson seeks to
prove that, even if determinism is true, responsibility still has a role to
play in our interpersonal relations. In making this argument, Strawson
states that responsibility must be seen in light of
[t]he very great importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions
toward us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our
personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about
those attitudes and intentions.11
Strawson proceeds to argue that these attitudes and intentions toward
others depend on the assumption that other human beings can be held
responsible for their actions.
To assume that determinism is true is to adopt what Strawson calls an
‘objective’ rather than a ‘participant’ attitude toward another human
person. And, to do so is
9 See R. Pierik, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Normative-Philosophical
Analysis’, Chapter 2 of this volume, 36.
10 P. Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’, reprinted in J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.),
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 45.
11 Ibid., at 48.
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to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy, as a subject for what, in a
wide range of senses, might be called treatment; as something certainly to
be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or
handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided . . . But it
cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to
involvement and participation with others in inter-personal human
relationships.12
Strawson’s thesis challenges us to consider how interpersonal relations
need to be taken into account when thinking about moral concepts. One
could analyse the concept of responsibility without even considering
these relationships, but to do so would undermine the role of responsi-
bility in many of our relationships – the ability to see others as fellow
human beings with whom we have concrete relationships that shape our
collective lives, rather than as violators of rules who must be punished or
corrected in order to be welcomed back into society. That is, Strawson’s
notion of responsibility reveals a role of responsibility that is not always
obvious; it solidiﬁes our relationships with each other and, in so doing,
makes community life more meaningful.
Even more importantly, Strawson is making the interesting claim that
without responsibility, communities make no sense. In other words, if the
concept of responsibility did not exist, we could not have meaningful
interpersonal relationships and, ipso facto, we could not have meaningful
societies and political communities. In a sense, Strawson is telling us that
without some notion of responsibility, social and political interactions
could not exist. Strawson, of course, is writing about domestic social and
political life. Yet, there is a potential for his ideas to contribute to our
understanding of international or global political relations. For instance,
Strawson’s idea about the centrality of reactive attitudes in the deploy-
ment of responsibility could reinforce ideas of international society as
theorised by ﬁgures such as Hedley Bull.13 This tradition of thought
poses itself against more structural realist arguments that do not see
states as having anything other than relations of conﬂict; the inter-
national society idea argues that their relations arise from shared under-
standings of themselves as part of a community. Responsibility as
theorised by Strawson might supplement this account.
More interestingly, if I turn to the idea of shared responsibility as
developed by Nollkaemper and Jacobs, Strawson’s argument reveals the
12 Ibid., at 51.
13 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
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potential for how these reactive attitudes toward a multiplicity of agents
in the international order might enfold even a larger number of agents
into some conception of global community. For instance, if I, as a citizen
of the United States, see that a multinational company is polluting the
Amazon rainforest, my reactive attitude to this ‘ﬁnding of responsibility’
can strengthen the idea that there is a larger international global or
political community of which I am part and which may prompt me to
act upon this realisation. Strawson’s framework allows us to see how
responsibility in this framework of shared responsibility might generate
new political responses to global harms.
One element of Strawson’s account that is under-theorised, however, is
the role of power in the construction of both responsibility and even in
our reactive attitudes to those claims of responsibility. One theorist who
does highlight the role of power is Marion Smiley, who argues in her
book Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community that moral
responsibility cannot be a function simply of our assumptions about will
and intentions.14 Rather, responsibility arises from two factors: one, the
social roles that communities establish for individuals, determining
whether or not they should be blamed for particular actions; and, two,
the power relations that exist between individuals that allow some to
blame others and, in so doing, reinforce or create anew those roles.
Individual persons become blameworthy or praiseworthy because of
the roles we create for them.
For example, mothers are expected to conform to certain roles in
terms of raising children, roles that can mean that they are deemed to
be responsible for the faults of their children in ways that fathers are not
(at least according to these socially deﬁned roles). Moreover, these roles
become part of the public discourse we use to think about and act upon
public problems. For instance, when reports appear arguing that children
raised by stay-at-home parents tend to have fewer social problems than
those who attend day care, various pundits will claim that this ‘proves’
that working mothers can be blamed for their children’s defects. Such an
assumption ignores the ways in which the role of ‘mother’, while cer-
tainly physical in part, is also a socially constructed role. Moreover, the
ways in which we blame and praise will not simply affect the individuals
at that moment, but will also have a long-term inﬂuence on how we
construct the role of mother. We can meaningfully blame and praise
14 M. Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power and Account-
ability from a Pragmatic Point of View (University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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individual mothers for actions in raising children, but we need to be
aware of how such statements of blame and praise rely upon and recreate
certain roles that partly determine the ways in which we hold mothers
responsible.
Smiley’s analysis demonstrates how power structures create roles for
individuals that lead to attributions of responsibility. Her argument
relates to Strawson’s point that there is a relationship between dis-
courses of responsibility and the social and political norms that struc-
ture community life. But, Smiley provides more precision to Strawson’s
account by highlighting that responsibility is not just necessary for our
interpersonal relationships to work; it is more than that because it
structures and is structured by the power relations that exist within
that society. Her critical insight on this point is crucial to understanding
the ways in which responsibility can and cannot function in inter-
national law and politics. Certainly, Smiley makes her argument in the
context of domestic law and politics, and it has, I think, some important
implications for international politics and law. Power is often invoked
in international law and politics as the only currency. Invocations of
responsibility need to be supplemented by this claim to power as well,
though not just in the simplistic way that realist theory so often does.
So, for instance, we might highlight not only the way in which one
powerful state dominates another, but how categories of international
criminal law reﬂect underlying power relations. One obvious example
would be the ways in which the International Criminal Court has only
examined cases from Africa rather than from other regions, reﬂecting
the longstanding view of Africa as an uncivilised arena that needs to be
governed by the West.
Smiley’s account, while written from the perspective of moral phil-
osophy, points us toward the political dimension of responsibility (as
does Strawson’s, though in a more roundabout way). Two political
theorists give a different reading of the politics of responsibility, each
highlighting a different dimension of the idea. The ﬁrst is William
Connolly. In Identity/Difference, Connolly explores the ways in which
formulations of responsibility structure the late modern response to
political life. He argues that while responsibility has had different
resonances across different cultural contexts, a version of it seems to
structure much of our reactions to wrongdoing and evil. For Connolly,
unlike Strawson, this need for responsibility is not something to
be celebrated, but something that may contain within it the ‘problem
of evil’:
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Perhaps standards of responsibility are both indispensable to social prac-
tice and productive of injustices within it. Perhaps because every society
demands some such standards, a problem of evil resides within any social
practice that fulﬁls this demand relentlessly.15
Connolly argues that the demand for responsibility represents a kind of
moral calculus that prevents any act of evil from slipping away
unaccounted for. In our attempts to locate all wrongdoing in structures
of responsibility, Connolly suggests that we force individuals into par-
ticular identities that do not accurately capture them. Put differently, the
multiple levels of causality that exist in the world, and our need as
humans to ﬁnd clear moral and sometimes legal judgments, results in
situations where the task of ‘ﬁnding someone responsible’ can perhaps
result in outcomes that do more harm than might have been intended.
The ‘evil’ that results, in other words, is intimately tied to our efforts to
ﬁnd responsible agents.
I ﬁnd Connolly’s critique of responsibility quite persuasive, for it
reveals how responsibility is a constructed concept and how its construc-
tion does not always lead to justice. At the same time, I do not want to
abandon responsibility because I agree with Strawson that it is too
fundamental to our shared lives, whether at the local, national, or global
levels. Rather than abandon responsibility, perhaps we need to be atten-
tive to the kinds of identities and communities it constructs. Moreover, it
may be that responsibility can generate some unexpected outcomes, ones
that are not the normal moves toward punishment or sanction.16
The ﬁnal theorist to be explored is Hannah Arendt. She develops the
concept of political agency, which is the status of individuals in a
community as being able to participate in the life of that community.
That status sometimes results from an ofﬁcial body conferring it, such as
in determinations of citizenship. At the same time, political agency does
not stop with that ofﬁcial conferment. Rather, it must be continually re-
inscribed by the engagement in the political, by working with and
15 W.E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1991), at 96.
16 I have argued, however, that one of the most important functions of holding an agent
responsible is to punish that agent, a move that Connolly wants to avoid. My view is that
punishment is central to political life and should be one of the results of ﬁnding an
individual responsible. But, in this chapter, I am trying to elucidate an alternative to
punishment and sanction that may arise from discourses of responsibility. For my
defence of punishment as a legitimate response to holding agents responsible, see A.F.
Lang Jr., ‘Crime and Punishment: Holding States Accountable’ (2007) 21(2) EIA 239.
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sometimes against others in the political community. Agency then results
not just from the actions of others giving one an ofﬁcial status but from
one’s own political activity.
This idea of political agency is developed in Arendt’s The Human
Condition.17 Political agency in Arendt’s understanding relies on a par-
ticular understanding of action, which is how human persons reveal
themselves in moments of interactions with others. It is the way in which
we assert who we are, in which we create ourselves by presenting
ourselves in public. Politics, which provides the constructed stage of a
parliament or town meeting, provides the paradigmatic instance of
moments in which the human person can be revealed. Arendt develops
this concept of action in an engagement with Greek and Roman philoso-
phers who sought to deﬁne the realm of the political. That realm,
combining a Homeric agonal spirit with an Aristotelian notion of speech
as the quintessentially human characteristic, results in a public space that
allows for competition and conﬂict.
According to Arendt, the public realm is the place where ‘everybody
had to constantly distinguish himself from all others, to show through
unique deeds or achievements that he was best of all’.18 Indeed, it is this
ability to act publicly that deﬁnes the human person:
A life without speech and without action, on the other hand – and this is
the only way of life that in earnest has renounced all appearance and all
vanity in the biblical sense of the word – is literally dead to the world; it
has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.
With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this
insertion is like a second birth, in which we conﬁrm and take upon
ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance.19
Public political action puts us into the world and reveals the ‘who’ of our
existence in a way that no other practice can.
Furthermore, since Arendt believes that political action is a public
presentation of the self, there must be a community to whom this
presentation is made. She notes that action occurs within a ‘web of
human relationships’, a place composed both of other people acting
and speaking and of the ‘common world’ that surrounds and anchors
human interaction: ‘most words and deeds are about some worldly
objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and
17 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958).
18 Ibid., at 41. 19 Ibid., at 176–177.
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speaking agent.’20 Politics thus requires a public realm, one composed of
fellow humans with an agreed upon equality, not one of merit but one
of agency.
This connects to Arendt’s idea of political responsibility. In her essay,
‘Collective Responsibility’, she distinguishes between guilt and responsi-
bility: ‘Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is strictly per-
sonal.’21 But while guilt is individual, responsibility can be corporate. She
notes that for collective responsibility to make sense two conditions must
apply:
I must be held responsible for something I have not done, and the reason
for my responsibility must be my membership in a group (a collective),
which no voluntary act of mine can dissolve, that is, a membership which
is utterly unlike a business partnership which I can dissolve at will.22
Collective responsibility applies most clearly, according to this concep-
tion, in cases where individuals are held responsible for what their
governments do. The context of her argument seems to be an attempt
to locate the responsibility of individuals who do not support the actions
of their government but who are being held responsible for that govern-
ment’s actions.
Arendt takes this point even further, however. Rather than simply
stating that collective responsibility is possible in these situations, she
argues that simply by living in the current world, one in which we are
automatically bound up in a community, we can never avoid responsi-
bility for the actions of our states. To clarify this, she notes that only
refugees are innocent of this collective responsibility, precisely because
they are outside the boundaries of any community. Arendt claims that
political nonparticipation, as a sign of political protest, does not alleviate
this responsibility. Simply by the fact that we live in a community, we are
responsible for its collective actions:
This vicarious responsibility for things we have not done, this taking upon
ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely innocent of, is the
price we pay for the fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but among
our fellow men, and that the faculty of action which, after all, is the
political faculty par excellence, can be actualized only in one of the many
and manifold forms of human community.23
20 Ibid., at 182 (emphasis in the original).
21 H. Arendt, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in H. Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (edited
and with an introduction by J. Kohn) (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), at 147.
22 Ibid., at 149. 23 Ibid., at 157–158.
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Political responsibility here connects with political agency. Rather than
moral agency that seeks to connect the agent with the will, political
agency and responsibility connect the individual to a wider realm, one
in which the human person is celebrated in all her individuality. While it
may seem strange to create a collective notion of responsibility when
Arendt is so concerned with individuality, her concept of responsibility is
about agency not about an internal will producing morally or legally
correct outcomes. Instead, it is a responsibility that arises from an
understanding that each action produces the political sphere anew.
Because of the emphasis she places on the ways in which agency con-
structs the public sphere, Arendt’s conception of responsibility arises
from that participation. If the public sphere is that place where no person
is made superﬂuous, but every person has the opportunity to enact
themselves and contribute to the creation of that sphere through their
deeds, acts that destroy that space will redound on all of us who have
acted and continue to act in that space.24 Constructing and sustaining the
public sphere is a joint exercise, and when that sphere is closed down or
parts of it are destroyed permanently, we all become responsible.
There are, of course, other versions of collective responsibility, ones
that go by a variety of terms, including shared responsibility and corpor-
ate responsibility. There is an important body of literature on collective
responsibility in international relations (IR) theory. One of the leading
theorists here is Toni Erskine, who provides the following deﬁnition of
collective moral agency:
A collectivity is a candidate for moral agency if it has the following: an
identity that is more than the sum of the identities of its constitutive parts
and, therefore, does not rely on a determinate membership; a decision-
making structure; an identity over time; and a conception of itself as a
unit.25
This deﬁnition, like others that address responsibility, focuses primarily
on the internal characteristics of the agent. In this account, Erskine
24 For an argument about Arendt and her concern with the dangers of individuals becoming
superﬂuous, see P. Hayden, ‘Superﬂuous Humanity: An Arendtian Perspective on the
Political Evil of Global Poverty’ (2007) 35(2) MJIS 279.
25 T. Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States
and “Quasi-States”’ (2001) 15(2) EIA 67, at 72; and T. Erskine (ed.), Can Institutions
Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). See also her chapter in this volume, T. Erskine ‘“Coalitions of
the Willing” and the Shared Responsibility to Protect’, Chapter 8, 227.
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focuses on the individual’s will and/or knowledge in ascribing responsi-
bility to her for past actions. Translating that approach to collective
moral agents, however, requires more careful consideration, which
Erskine and others provide.26 For individuals, internal characteristics
include the mind, the will, and the emotions. For collective agents,
however, internal characteristics must include things like bureaucracy,
constitutional structure, and/or social arrangements.
Before turning to the idea of responsibility in international law, one
ﬁnal distinction needs to be made. As a result of this last point, I would
suggest that corporate agents are more relevant in understanding respon-
sibility than collective ones. By this, I do not mean corporations in the
purely economic sense of the term. Rather, I understand a corporation as
a more formalised group structure than a collective. A collective is a
group of persons, who may or may not be organised and capable of
acting with intention. A corporation, on the other hand, is a group that is
recognised through a formal process and has a particular structure that
allows it to intend, plan, and execute actions. Holding collectives respon-
sible is not justiﬁed, but holding corporations responsible is justiﬁed and,
as Sarah Seck demonstrates, an important part of most legal systems.27
Richard Vernon’s argument that states and not nations can be held
responsible and punished, an argument he poses in contrast to the
famous attempt by Karl Jaspers to hold Germany responsible as a nation,
could be ﬁt into this distinction, if he called a nation a ‘collective’ and a
state a ‘corporation’.28
Businesses that are incorporated are designed to locate agency and
responsibility in a particular structure and the wider legal order in order
to avoid having any individuals within them held responsible for wrongs
the corporation might commit. So, the suffering that individuals experi-
ence when a corporation is punished can be justiﬁed because the
26 The work of Larry May is exemplary here; see L. May, The Morality of Groups (University
of Notre Dame Press, 1987) and L. May, Sharing Responsibility (University of Chicago
Press, 1992). For a range of debates about collective responsibility, see L. May and S.
Hoffman (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and
Applied Ethics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 1991).
27 S.L. Seck, ‘Collective Responsibility and Transnational Corporate Conduct’, in T. Isaacs
and R. Vernon (eds.), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge University
Press, 2011), at 140. While Seck provides evidence of how the law deals with corporate
crime, the title of her chapter elides this important distinction between collectives and
corporations.
28 R. Vernon, ‘Punishing Collectives: States or Nations?’, in T. Isaacs and R. Vernon (eds.),
Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 287.
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individuals involved understand that they are acting as a corporate entity
recognised as such. In Seck’s review of corporations as subjects of liability
for global harms, such as climate change, they are on one level certainly
responsible. But, at a deeper level, it is the legal and political order that
creates corporations that should also be responsible for the harms they
commit. In other words, if states create corporations without regulatory
frameworks or limits on their proﬁt making, then the state should be
considered somehow responsible. The idea that corporate agents exist
within political, legal, and even social orders points us back to the ideas
developed earlier; that is, our notions of responsibility are constitutive of,
and constituted by, the communities within which we live (Strawson);
that these communities function through the exercise of power (Smiley);
that our desire to ﬁnd responsible agents results in practices that generate
more harm than good (Connolly); and that one solution to these tensions
is to develop ways of reconstructing the communities within which
agents – corporate and personal – function by engaging in forms of new
political actions (Arendt). Through these steps, we can see, then, how we
might use responsibility in new ways, primarily as a political practice that
might generate new political and even legal institutions and orders.
These arguments point to how wider political and legal orders create
responsible agents, which I would call a ‘constitutional system’. At the
end of this chapter, I will demonstrate that while the global constitutional
order has created states that seemingly escape liability, that order can be
restructured in such a way that it places more regulatory limits on what
states can do. One way to do that is to create a legal order in which states
are not only held responsible but perhaps punished, something I have
argued for elsewhere.29 But in this chapter I point to some alternatives to
punishment and sanction. For perhaps a better response when we hold
agents responsible is to look toward alternative political forms by which
the problems agents have created can be resolved. That is, following
Arendt, I would like to point more toward responsibility that is not
simply a legalistic move toward punishment, but is a political move
toward alternative forms of action that might generate new structures
and institutions. In pursuit of this objective, though, let me review one
more body of literature concerning responsibility, the discourse of inter-
national legal responsibility.
29 Lang, ‘Crime and Punishment: Holding States Accountable’, n. 16. See also, A.F. Lang, Jr.
Punishment, Justice and International Relations: Ethics and Order after the Cold War
(London: Routledge, 2008).
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3. Responsibility in international law
In one sense, a legal discourse on responsibility is surprising, for respon-
sibility is more of a moral or political term than a legal one. The more
accurate term in the law would be ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’. For instance, in a
contractual relationship, the two parties do not have responsibilities
toward each other but have obligations. Alternatively, when one has
violated a law, one is considered liable rather than responsible for the
harms committed. Responsibility has, one might say, a ‘softer’ meaning
than the more precise legal terms such as ‘obligation’ or ‘liability’.
Yet in international law there is, in fact, a robust literature on responsi-
bility. In 2001, the International Law Commission drafted the Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on
State Responsibility)30 and in 2011 they passed the Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations.31 While these are relatively
recent pieces of international law, the notion of responsibility has long
been part of the international legal discourse. As Alain Pellet reminds us,
responsibility is intimately tied to the central idea of the international
legal order that all sovereign states are equal.32 Pellet also points out that
the fact that the French word responsibilité conﬂates the two distinct
meanings of responsibility and liability;33 perhaps a reason international
law draws on the term responsibility rather than liability is because of the
use of French as the diplomatic and legal language of nineteenth-century
international law.
Although the term is common in international legal discourse, it
includes a diversity of different meanings. Its use in traditional inter-
national law reﬂects something closer to ‘private’ or ‘civil’ law meanings;
that is, a violation of the rights of one state by another gives rise to a need
for reparations. This meaning can be found in nineteenth-century legal
30 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook
2001/II(2) (Articles on State Responsibility); see J. Crawford (ed.), The International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries
(Cambridge University Press, 2003).
31 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, ILC Report on the work of
its sixty-third session, UNGAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011); see
M. Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of International Organizations (Leiden: Brill Publishing,
2013).
32 A. Pellet, ‘The Deﬁnition of Responsibility in International Law’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet,
and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press,
2011), 3.
33 Ibid., at 11.
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discourse when the legal equality of states was emerging.34 States were in
something like a contractual relationship with each other, so a violation was
a breach of that contract. But the meaning of responsibility also includes a
‘public law’ dimension, in which states are understood to be ‘responsible’ to
the international community as a whole. One can see this change in the
debates and discussions that surrounded the drafting of the Articles on State
Responsibility. The Articles establish that a state can invoke damages by one
state against it, and hence make a claim of responsibility. Yet, as James
Crawford notes, this is not the only way responsibility can be invoked:
The Articles also make provision for the invocation of responsibility in
the absence of any direct form of injury, where the obligation breached is
one protecting the collective interests of a group of states or the interests
of the international community as a whole.35
In other words, built into the concept of international legal responsibility
is a bifurcated understanding of the term, one that is ‘private’ and one
that is ‘public’.36
The other complicating element of international responsibility is that
it is used in reference to both people and states. This is a recent change,
one that arose as a result of the creation of international tribunals and
culminating in the creation of the International Criminal Court. The
ability of the international community to hold individuals responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide has generated two
sorts of responsibility. As I have argued elsewhere, this has resulted in
something like two competing constitutional orders, one where individ-
ual persons are agents and the other in which states are agents.37
34 Martti Koskenniemi argues that this ‘private’ nature of international legal responsibility
can be traced to the natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf. I think he is incorrect
on this point, as Grotius argued from a natural law foundation in which a violation of the
laws of nature was a violation of the order as a whole rather than a violation of the rights
of individuals. Of course, Grotius did help create the idea of natural rights, but I am not
convinced that his understanding of responsibility derives from rights rather than law.
See M. Koskenniemi, ‘Doctrines of State Responsibility’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S.
Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011),
45, at 47.
35 J. Crawford, ‘The System of International Responsibility’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S.
Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011),
17, at 24.
36 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual
Framework’, n. 7, at 400–403.
37 A.F. Lang, Jr., ‘Conﬂicting Rules: Global Constitutionalism and the Kosovo Intervention’
(2009) 3(2) JIS 185.
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So, within the idea of international legal responsibility, there are a
range of conﬂicting notions. André Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs try to
negotiate some of these tensions with their idea of ‘shared
responsibility’.38 They propose a slightly altered understanding of the
corporate/collective distinction, one that focuses less on the collective
nature of the state itself and more on the range of agents in the inter-
national order who may or may not contribute to various harms. In one
passage, they highlight what they see as the two possible purposes of
responsibility, purposes which correspond to the distinction between the
‘private’ and ‘public’ nature of this concept: ﬁrst, to protect the rights of
individual agents in the international order; or second, to reinforce the
centrality of law in the international political order. Further, they propose
that a modiﬁed version of the idea of ‘joint and several responsibility’
might provide some means by which alternative uses of international
responsibility can be deployed. They note that there are difﬁculties with
applying this idea, one drawn from civil law contexts, to the public
international legal order. As such, they propose some substantive and
procedural variations on the international legal order that might address
these tensions.
Nollkaemper and Jacobs open up the concept of responsibility through
their thorough development of the idea of a ‘shared responsibility’. In so
doing, they widen our scope to include a range of agents in the inter-
national legal and political order whose consent and control need to be
better understood as playing a crucial role in the creation of harms at the
global level. Their concept is ideally placed to build upon the idea of
political responsibility proposed in the previous section. Certainly, the
idea of political responsibility I have developed here does not correspond
with most international legal notions. But, what makes Nollkaemper and
Jacobs’ account helpful is that it reveals one of the obvious tensions
within the international order, that is, that there are multiplicity of agents
not only who can be held responsible, but who can act in order to achieve
outcomes. This includes individual people, local governments, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), states, and supranational and inter-
national organisations. As suggested in the next section, there may well
be agents that currently do not exist but which might need to be created
in order to tackle climate change, a type of political action that Arendt
would call ‘natality’ or the practice of creating anew. A political project
38 See Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual
Framework’, n. 7 for a similar point.
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arising from attributions of responsibility, such as explained by Arendt in
the previous section, would certainly protect rights and reinforce the
importance of the rule of law; but, I want to argue, it should also give the
opportunity to a range of agents to create new ideas and visions for
tackling problems such as climate change. So, prompted by the idea of
shared responsibility, I want to conclude this chapter with some sugges-
tions for how a notion of ‘shared responsibility’ can lead to forms of
‘shared political action’ in order to move forward on the problems of
climate change.
4. Climate change, responsibility, and politics
There is obviously a wealth of scholarship on climate change, including
the international and domestic legal dimensions. The focus of this chap-
ter is less on the detailed analyses of the law surrounding climate change
policy but instead the ways in which the idea of political responsibility
might be deployed in responding to the dilemmas raised by it.
It is worth highlighting that responsibility plays a central part in
discussions of climate change. As noted in the introduction, most scien-
tiﬁc analyses point to the role that human action has played in bringing
about climate change. Rather than legal, moral, or political responsibility,
this point is really something closer to causal responsibility. That is, no
one individual or group of individuals ‘intended’ to bring about climate
change. Rather, it is the result of the cumulative actions of the entire
human race.39 One might argue, then, that there is no moral or legal
responsibility for climate change since no agent intended it, and no agent
was in any particular role that generates the responsibility to resolve the
problem. Here, though, the idea of shared responsibility becomes helpful.
One might go so far as to say that there is a universally shared responsi-
bility for climate change, one that has moral and political implications.
International politics and law have tried to turn this into a single
multilateral treaty regime, the Kyoto Protocol, as a way to share that
responsibility. But, as the political debate highlights, this responsibility is
differentiated, which means that those states or companies generating
more carbon dioxide (CO2) than others will be responsible for different
forms of action. This has led to debates about developing world
39 Nollkaemper and Jacobs identity cumulative responsibility as a subgroup of shared
responsibility, see ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Frame-
work’, n. 7, at 368.
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responsibilities in relation to developed world states, debates which have
been highly contentious and which feed into the colonial legacy of the
global system.
Rather than engage directly in this legal debate or try to parse out
exactly which responsibilities are to be attributed to which agents, I want
to highlight some alternative responses that build on the idea of responsi-
bility for climate change but turn toward political action. Each of these
actions will be located in terms of the idea of responsibility on which they
rely and will be evaluated in terms of the concept of shared political
responsibility that I have developed in the previous section.
4.1 Liberal individuals and climate change
Political philosophers have approached the problem of climate change in
terms of the liberal individual, especially in terms of the individual’s
moral responsibilities. There is a large body of literature that seeks to
address these themes, but a recent work provides one possible political
response worth considering. Elizabeth Cripps argues that climate change
generates a set of moral responsibilities, but the ability to fulﬁl these
responsibilities is severely hampered by the practical problems of collect-
ive action. But Cripps does not abandon her notion of responsibility, but
explores the nature of the choices that individuals have when it comes to
this issue. Her argument makes an interesting move in that she suggests
our failure to act will ‘mar’ us as individuals, resulting in a stunted
conception of ourselves and our place in the world if we fail to act. In
addition, because climate change requires collective action Cripps sug-
gests that for us to reconcile the potential tensions that arise from our
inability to reconcile our responsibilities we must engage in some form of
collective action to address climate change.40
Cripps’ account provides us with a morally grounded reason to act,
one that moves away from the liberal account of rights toward something
like a republican account of active citizenship. Yet, she does not provide
any details about how that responsibility might be fulﬁlled, instead
providing moral reasons for why we should feel responsible and how
individuals should be able to translate their internal feelings of responsi-
bility into some form of political action.
40 E. Cripps, Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent
World (Oxford University Press, 2013).
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Some who write from within the tradition of liberal political philoso-
phy suggest ways that we might turn this internal responsibility into
concrete political actions. One political response comes from those who
argue that there are a set of environmental rights that generate obliga-
tions or responsibilities in association with those rights. There are two
versions of this argument. The ﬁrst argues that states need to make
concrete the right to a clean environment through changes to their
constitutions. The clearest position along these lines comes from Tim
Hayward who argues that there is a universal right to a clean environ-
ment which ought to be made part of each state’s constitution.41
Hayward adopts a Hohfeldian set of assumptions about rights and
obligations, which means that any right generates a set of corresponding
duties or obligations. This is the stronger notion of responsibility identi-
ﬁed earlier, one that is not moral but strongly legal. In fact, Hayward does
not use the idea of responsibility in his analysis. Moreover, his account
proposes that such rights must be justiciable in order for them to be
meaningful. This state-based conception of constitutional responsibility
is an important move from Cripps’ account of the need to act into a
practical and political outcome. Yet, precisely because it is focused on
national constitutions, Hayward’s account does not quite correspond to
the idea of shared political responsibility developed in this chapter. The
idea of shared responsibility proposed by Nollkaemper and Jacobs high-
lights the essentially international character of certain issues, and pro-
poses a way in which different agents, not just states, can contribute to
how we might respond to this. At the same time, Hayward’s idea about
how states can act by changing their constitutions is an important part of
the construction of this shared response.
A different but related political account comes from Andrew Dobson
who proposes a form of ‘environmental citizenship’.42 Dobson’s account
of citizenship moves beyond the state and even beyond a liberal focus on
rights. Instead, he argues for a more republican inspired notion of
citizenship, one that prompts new forms of political action that transcend
obligations to a single community and instead seek to formulate response
to the global problems of the environment. He argues for a form of
‘ecological’ citizenship rather than merely environmental, the distinction
being one that draws on an understanding of the human relation to the
environment that goes beyond merely protecting the human race and
41 T. Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005).
42 A. Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 2003).
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moves toward a deeper engagement with the natural world. Dobson
focuses his practical responses on education, arguing that even in trad-
itional liberal societies there is a responsibility to teach future generations
about the environment in ways that go beyond their own communities.
These three accounts build on the idea of the individual agent, but take
that agency in different directions. Cripps, by turning inward, suggests
how the individual’s moral responsibility can generate collective actions.
Hayward makes concrete how that action can be turned into constitution
making. And Dobson points us to how we can move beyond the liberal
individual state. The modes of action proposed here do point us toward
different ways we might engage in the global order, which can contribute
to the idea of shared political responsibility developed in the preceding
section. The ideas developed here should be read as how we might
construct some actionable responses to climate change.
4.2 Responding to international legal responsibility
The preceding accounts focused on themes arising from the state, rights,
and citizenship, although they seek to transcend them. Other efforts to
deal with climate change and environmental issues begin with inter-
national elements but turn those into local action. The ﬁrst comes from
an innovative book by Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett, Global Democ-
racy and Sustainable Jurisprudence, who address head on one of the
problems of environmental politics – the debate surrounding the scien-
tiﬁc evidence about various issues, which leaves many individuals around
the world unwilling or unable to act politically to change it.43 They argue
that there is a responsibility not only to act, but to understand more
clearly what is happening in the environment, something that they do
not believe can be left only to the scientiﬁc community. As such, they
propose the use of deliberative democracy as a means to generate polit-
ical change. Importantly, writing from the perspective of international
law, they suggest that there needs to be communities created around the
world that can play a role in translating environmental science and
political action into various forms of law making. These communities
of deliberation can be structured around speciﬁc problems in commu-
nities but then translate those problems to a global scope and begin
linking them together. Such groups would include scientists, political
43 W.F. Baber and R.V. Bartlett, Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence: Delibera-
tive Environmental Law (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
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activists, and lawyers in an effort to create materials that could be turned
into national, regional, or even international law.
This proposal maps on well with the idea of shared political responsi-
bility developed in this chapter. Multiple sites of agency with different
forms of representation might contribute to a new political movement.
With both political and educative dimensions, these small councils can
be part of a wider discursive structure that shares the responsibilities of
climate change, but turns those shared needs into actions. It builds on the
ideas of Cripps, Hayward, and Dobson in that it allows individuals to act,
can contribute to national and even global constitutions, and provides a
means to better educate the wider global public.
Matthew Hoffman provides evidence for how activism around climate
change has emerged at a range of levels, often in response to the failure of
international legal efforts to create multilateral treaties. His argument is
less a normative one and more of a descriptive or explanatory one, in
which he explores various ‘experiments’ at dealing with climate change
that have arisen since the passage of the Kyoto Protocol.44 Hoffman’s
account points to the ways in which schemes such as regional cap and
trade agreements in North America, ones which cross the US-Canadian
border, or municipal efforts to limit carbon emissions have been emerged
in the fact of national failures to act. The US Congress, for instance, has
failed to act on its commitments to the Kyoto Protocol which has
resulted in US governors and mayors acting in their place. Additionally,
Hoffman points to how multinational companies like Cisco Corporation
have worked with NGOs such as the Clinton Foundation to encourage
greater internet connectivity in cities to lessen the carbon impact of
commuting. These efforts are prompted by the idea of responsibility,
and an acknowledgement that the international legal responsibilities of
states has not been translated into action. As such, actors at a number of
different levels have moved responsibility from the state, to state treaty
making processes, to forms of political action.
This account suggests some ways in which existing government struc-
tures, as opposed to Baber and Bartlett’s proposed structures, are acting
in the face of failed efforts of states. Hoffman’s suggestions are useful in
allowing us to see how shared political responsibility can emerge from
diverse levels of government. Here we ﬁnd actual descriptions of political
action that can generate new insights and policies on climate change. As
44 M.J. Hoffman, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global
Response after Kyoto (Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Hoffman notes, these are experiments, so there is no guarantee of their
success. But, as Arendt and others have argued, at times we need to
engage in efforts to create new structures without full knowledge of what
the outcome will be.
4.3 Radical responsibility
The previous examples point to ways in which political action can arise
from discourses of responsibility. The last example I wish to highlight is a
more radical one, drawing on a deeper ecological sentiment than the
previous analyses which, as a result, challenges our accepted meanings of
agency and responsibility. Jane Bennet argues in Vibrant Matter that an
anthropocentric approach to political life fails to appreciate the complex-
ities of agency. She argues that distinguishing between matter and life, as
much of philosophical and political discourse does without thinking,
ignores various ways in which political life is shaped by non-human
materiality. For instance, she looks to an essay by Charles Darwin whose
study of worms ended with the pithy observation that they ‘make his-
tory’.45 She acknowledges that this is a form of anthropomorphism but
she embraces this accusation rather than defend against it. Using Jacques
Ranciere’s notion of democracy as a form of irruption, she argues that
such irruptions in political life need not come from intentional human
persons but can come from various forces in the wider world. Darwin’s
point was that worms keep in place certain artefacts and destroy others,
making them authors of a kind of history. This agency is vital to how
history evolves and how humans understand themselves.
How does this relate to the questions of responsibility for climate
change in this chapter? Bennett only brieﬂy refers to climate change,
but her argument is directly relevant to the claims I am making. Early in
her text, she highlights how responsibility assumes an intentional agent
who we can identify and reward or punish if necessary. Drawing here on
Connolly’s critique of the politics of responsibility,46 Bennett suggests
that if we relax our assumptions about human agency and allow other
forms of agency to develop, our ideas about responsibility will also
evolve. Using the idea of an assemblage (from Deleuze and Guatarri),
Bennett argues that responsibility is better located in ‘human-nonhuman
45 J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press,
2010), at 94–109.
46 W. Connolly, Identity/Difference, n. 15, at 16–35.
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assemblages’.47 Rather than a resignation that no one is to blame, how-
ever, Bennett encourages us to consider how to respond as persons to this
situation of political responsibility. She argues that we must resist a
politics of blame and instead consider how we should relate to the
human-nonhuman assemblages in which we are enmeshed.
This is, admittedly, a more radical response to environmental prob-
lems and is less concrete than some of the suggestions listed earlier. What
it does, however, is highlight the ways in which the very concepts of
agency and responsibility might be limiting our ability to respond to the
environment. Bennet is a political theorist, so she argues for a politics of
change. But it is a politics of change and action that force us to confront
some of our ingrained assumptions about what responsibility means.
And, interestingly, with her focus on the idea of assemblages, Bennet
suggests a slightly different idea of ‘shared politics’, though perhaps
without the element of responsibility. That is, her argument is one that
brings together not just individual people, but a wider range of ‘agents’ in
our understanding of the problems of climate change and our possible
responses to it.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has built on the idea of shared responsibility
in the international legal framework of Nollkaemper and Jacobs to
develop an idea of shared political responsibility. In so doing, I am not
trying to argue that we need to put aside legal responsibility or the
international legal context. Indeed, some of what I consider to be the
most innovate ideas reviewed here can take up the theme of shared
responsibility and develop it in new ways. For instance, the notion of
shared legal responsibility might be one way to interpret the modes of
mixed political action that Hoffman describes, or the locations of delib-
erative action that Baber and Bartlett propose. More radically, Bennett’s
ideas about assemblages suggest a sharing of responsibility not only with
persons but with a wider ambit of the natural world.
The primary point I wish to make is that our discourse of responsi-
bility, while viewed through moral and legal frames, can also be seen
through a political one. Arendt’s idea that collective responsibility means
we must accept that being part of a community generates responsibilities
47 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, n. 45, at 36.
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to act is one that permeates this chapter. If we expand Arendt’s frame to
see that we are part of the ‘human’ community or, in accordance with
Bennett, a ‘natural’ community, then perhaps our modes of action will
turn to new and different frames. The nature of shared political responsi-
bility provides a possible way to act in the current global order. The
problems of climate change demand nothing less.
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